In this paper, we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the core. The planner's exercise consists of designing a code of rights, which speci…es the collection of coalitions that have the right to block one outcome by moving to another. A code of individual rights is a code of rights in which only unit coalitions may have blocking powers. We provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for implementation (under core equilibria) by codes of rights as well as by codes of individual rights. We show that these two modes of implementation are not equivalent. This result is proven robust and extends to alternative notions of core, such as that of an externally stable core. Therefore, coalitions are shown to bring value added to institutional design. The characterization results address the limitations that restrict the relevance of existing implementation theory.
Introduction
The challenge of implementation lies in designing a mechanism (i.e., game form)
where the equilibrium behavior of agents always coincides with the recommendations given by a social choice rule (SCR). If such a mechanism exists, the SCR is said to be implementable.
As such, the key question is how to design an implementing mechanism such that its outcomes are predicted through the application of game theoretic solution concepts. Most early studies on implementation focused on noncooperative solution concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium and its re…nements. However, one of the di¢ culties with this approach is that the canonical mechanisms are typically complex and di¢ cult to explain in natural terms, as they rely on tail-chasing constructions, such as the integer game.
As demonstrated in the seminal paper by Koray and Yildiz (2018) [henceforth KY] , an alternative to the noncooperative approach is to allow groups of agents to coordinate their behaviors in a mutually bene…cial way. To move away from noncooperative modeling, the details of coalition formation are left unmodeled. Then, coalitions-not individuals-become basic decision making units. Here, the role of the solution concept is to explain why, when, and which coalition forms and what it can achieve.
More importantly, the chosen coalitional solution concept is independent of the physical structure under which coalition formation takes place (see, e.g., Chwe, 1994 ).
This structure, often de…ned by an e¤ectivity relationship, speci…es which coalitions are permitted to form given the status quo outcome and what they can achieve when they form, that is, what new status quo outcomes they can induce. From the implementation viewpoint, the e¤ectivity relationship is the design variable of the planner and plays the role of mechanism.
KY formalize this idea and study its implications. In their framework, SCR implementation is achieved by designing a generalization of the e¤ectivity relationship, introduced by Sertel (2001) , called a rights structure.
1 A rights structure consists of a state space S, an outcome function h that associates every state to an outcome, and a code of rights . A code of rights speci…es, for each pair of distinct states (s; t), a collection of coalitions (s; t) e¤ective in moving from s to t. The rights structure is more ‡exible than the e¤ectivity function, as it allows strategic options of coalitions to depend on how the status quo outcome is reached (i.e., on the current state).
As coalitional solution, KY adopt a version of the core, referred to as the equilibrium.
A state s is an equilibrium state under a given rights structure and agents'preferences if no e¤ective coalition can guarantee each of its members a utility level higher than the one they receive under s. Then, the implementation problem consists of designing a rights structure , with the property that, for each pro…le of agents'preferences, its equilibrium outcomes under those preferences coincide with the outcomes a given SCR would select for that pro…le. If such a rights structure exists, the SCR is said to be implementable by a rights structure.
The implications of KY's approach are interesting. Any SCR that is implementable by a rights structure can also be implemented by a rights structure in which only unit coalitions have blocking powers, that is, an individual-based rights structure, and vice versa. A counterintuitive implication of this result is that coalition formation does not bring any value added to the implementation by the rights structure. As such, for all purposes, it is su¢ cient to focus on unit coalitions alone.
The question is then why should institutions be designed based on coalition formation, as is often the case? For example, under a typical democratic constitution, a bill can only be passed by consent from a majority of individuals.
Consequently, the scope of this paper is analyzing the insights of KY's study.
Speci…cally, we generalize their characterization results, and our characterizations, which are complete in each case, are easy to verify and provide comparative information on the restrictiveness of di¤erent implementation modes. More importantly, our conditions allow determining when and why coalitions matter under implementation by right structures.
We …rst provide a general characterization of the SCRs that are implementable by rights structures. We show that (Maskin) monotonicity and unanimity, both being restricted to a superset of the SCR image, are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for implementation. 2 More importantly, this result does not make any domain assumptions and, hence, the result generalizes KY's characterization, which assumes a full domain of preferences.
To answer the above question, we focus on the simple and natural restriction of rights structures already introduced by KY. We take the set of outcomes as our state space, that is, we assume that the implementation device is an e¤ectivity relationship or, using the terminology of KY, a code of rights. Technically, we assume that outcome function h is the identity map and the implementation exercise by rights structures is reduced to the design of a code of rights , which speci…es, for each pair of outcomes x and y, a collection of e¤ective coalitions (x; y) that can induce y from x. Under this framework, the equilibrium notion of KY is reduced to the familiar notion of core:
an outcome x is an equilibrium under a given code of rights and a given pro…le of preferences if there is no coalition K that will …nd it bene…cial to reject x and induce an outcome that renders all members of K better o¤. Therefore, the implementation problem consists of designing a code of rights with the property that, for each pro…le of agents'preferences, its equilibrium outcomes under those preferences coincide with the outcomes a given SCR would select for that pro…le. If such a code of rights exists, the SCR is said to be implementable by a code of rights.
3 2 Maskin's monotonicity condition is known in the social choice literature under the name strong positive association (e.g., Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) . 3 Our approach is di¤erent from Peleg and Winter's (2002) , who use the notion of e¤ectivity by Moulin and Peleg (1982) to appeal to the notion of implementation, where the game form not only
Note that a code of rights captures the allocation of blocking powers in many reallife situations in a natural way. In most democratic legislatures, bills are proposed and amended under a process of deliberation until the …nal version is adopted or rejected by a majority of individuals (see, e.g., Ray and Vohra, 2014) . This notion has some theoretical advantages, as the power of a coalition in a code of rights does not depend on how the state is reached but only what its physical implications are,
that is, what is the status quo outcome to become implemented. Arguably, this type of distribution for coalitional power is rather in line with the standard approach of coalition formation, which abstracts from the details of the coalition formation process.
We demonstrate that the implementation by a code of rights is fundamentally dependent on nonsingleton coalitions. To this end, we identify two necessary conditions for implementability: one is the unanimity condition and the other we call strong monotonicity, being stronger than (Maskin) monotonicity (see Section 5). These two conditions are again di¤erent from the characterization of KY, which is only applicable under a full domain of preferences. We prove that the two conditions are also su¢ cient for implementation by codes of rights. More importantly, this full characterization result is without restrictions over the preference domain.
We also study an implementation by codes of rights under which only unit coalitions can induce new outcomes. We call this type of codes of rights codes of individual rights. Under this setting, we identify the necessary condition for implementability, which we call singleton strong monotonicity. This condition is also su¢ cient when combined with unanimity.
Singleton strong monotonicity implies strong monotonicity but, as we will demonstrate, they are not equivalent. Therefore, the key insight for the implementation implements an SCR under Nash equilibrium but also induces the same distribution of power as that of the implemented SCR. See also Peleg et al. (2005) . Moreover, Moulen (1988, 1989 )'s analysis is a special case of ours, because in their model there is a simple game, rather than a code of rights, that speci…es coalitions that have the right to block one outcome by moving to another.
by rights structures-that coalitions do not matter-does not extend to the implementation by codes of rights. The underlying reason for this observation is that implementation by an individual right structure requires a signi…cant amount of information concerning the preferences of the agent permitted to move at a particular state. When the state space is coarsened, the needed information may no longer be conveyed by the underlying state. Since the preferences of a coalition are less volatile than those of an individual agent, coalitions may no longer be usefully replaceable by individuals. An example is the majority solution, which is implementable by a majority coalition-based code of rights but not by an individual-based one.
This conclusion is robust and can be extended to the implementation by codes of rights for alternative core de…nitions. Indeed, we add to the notion of core the requirement that blocking must be achievable through outcomes that are themselves in the core, meaning we also consider implementation by codes of rights of what is often referred to as an externally stable core. We call this type of implementation externally stable implementation by codes of rights. This externally stable implementation is a robust way of implementing outcomes, being more reliable than the implementation of core outcomes, since external stability guarantees that no outcome outside the core can be sustained. Moreover, an externally stable core is also more robust than the Von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set or its derivatives, since it avoids indirect internal stability problems (i.e., the Harsanyi critique; Harsanyi, 1974).
We provide a full characterization of this type of implementation by showing that strong winner monotonicity-a strengthening of the strong monotonicity-unanimity, and the no-simultaneous domination of F are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for implementation. Again, these conditions are di¤erent from those introduced by KY in the context of externally stable implementation by a rights structure, which are only applicable under a full domain assumption. Instead, our characterization does not make any domain assumptions. More importantly, we show that an externally stable implementation by codes of rights is not equivalent to an externally stable implementation by codes of individual rights, thus providing further motivation to examine why coalitions should matter in implementation. A counterexample is the majority solution.
2 On monotonicity conditions and tail-chasing constructions
The solution concept of this paper-the core-can be viewed as a generalization of the Nash equilibrium. Indeed, as demonstrated by KY, every normal form game can be formulated as a code of rights and its Nash equilibrium as the core associated with the game. The same applies to strong Nash implementation, which also accounts for coalitional deviations (i.e., monotonicity conditions for implementation in strong Nash equilibrium are more stringent than those for Nash implementation; see Maskin, 1981; Korpela, 2013) . Therefore, any (strongly) Nash implementable SCR is also implementable via a code of rights. Still, the implication does not extend in the other direction.
However, there are striking di¤erences between the two modes of implementation.
At the heart of the various characterization results concerning Nash implementation are monotonicity conditions, which compare the alternatives chosen by a given SCR under pairs of preference pro…les. Generally, this is an easy task and makes monotonicity an attractive condition to work with. Surprisingly, as shown by Maskin (1999, working paper 1977), this type of monotonicity is also almost su¢ cient for implementation with at least three agents, and monotonicity plus a condition of no veto power is su¢ cient. However, this result, as well as the full characterization of Moore and Repullo (1990) , relies on the construction of mechanisms with unnatural features. On one hand, their strategy spaces are complex and di¢ cult to interpret in natural terms and, on the other, the construction relies on tail-chasing procedures to eliminate unwanted equilibria (see Jackson, 1992 and Matsushima, 1992 ). 4 The mechanisms used in this paper or those of KY do not rely on any tail-chasing constructions. As the monotonicity condition that characterizes SCRs implementable by rights structures is just a version of (Maskin) monotonicity, it is worth asking how our canonical mechanism can eliminate unwanted equilibria. The reason lies within the ‡exibility of the rights structure. Unlike normal form games, where the strategy space associated with a player is independent of the strategies chosen by other players, a rights structure permits careful tailoring of the blocking coalitions for each state.
Therefore, in normal form games, the formation of a new equilibrium after a deviation from untruthful reporting must be blocked by triggering a tail-chasing construction;
in the context of rights structure, this can be achieved by simply …nding a blocking coalition for the target state of the deviation. Thus, the additional degree of freedom in the design of the rights structure can be used to block unwanted equilibria ex post, on farsighted coalition formation, do not have a clear answer in the current context. 5 As pointed out by KY, implementation via rights structures is a myopic concept.
However, it is noteworthy that strengthening the solution concept makes the problem of farsightedness less pronounced. This can be clearly seen with reference to implementation under externally stable solution concepts by a code of rights, under which the mode of implementation is characterized by strong winner monotonicity and unanimity. Indeed, the mechanism associated with this characterization result allows deviations from any untruthful, non-desired equilibria so that they lead to a desired equilibrium in one step. Hence, the solution is consistent with all behaviors being farsighted. This is important because it implies that strong winner monotonicity (along with unanimity) characterizes a mode of implementation free both from tail-chasing procedures and myopicity. Furthermore, as the devised mechanism associated with the characterization of the class of SCRs that are externally stable implementable by a code of rights is the same as that constructed for implementation by a code of rights, the results also show that SCRs satisfying strong monotonicity and unanimity can be implemented in a way that they are free from both criticisms. 6 One bene…t of our characterizations is that the monotonicity conditions associated with the modes of implementation are progressively more stringent-and directly comparable-when we move towards more demanding solution concepts. Moreover, they make the comparisons between coalition-and individual-based solutions transparent.
The remainder of this paper is divided into …ve sections. Section 3 sets out the theoretical framework and outlines the basic model. Section 4 revisits the implementation by rights structures. Section 5 provides a novel characterization of the class of SCRs implementable via codes of rights, whereas Section 6 fully characterizes the class of SCRs that are externally stable implementable by codes of rights. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
We consider a …nite (nonempty) set of agents, denoted by N = f1; ; ng, and a (nonempty) set of outcomes, denoted by Z. For every set A, the power set of A is The preference domain, denoted by R, consists of the set of admissible preference pro…les.
For R and K, we write xR K y for xR i y for all i 2 K and xP K y for xP i y for all
The goal of the designer is to implement an SCR F , de…ned by F : R ! Z 0 . We refer to x 2 F (R) as an F -optimal outcome at R. The range of F is the set
Following KY, to implement F , the designer designs a rights structure , which is a triplet (S; h; ), where S is the state space, h : S ! Z the outcome function, and a code of rights, which is a (possibly empty) correspondence : S S N .
Subsequently, a code of rights speci…es, for each pair of distinct states (s; t), a family of coalitions (s; t) entitled to approve a change from state s to t. A rights structure is said to be an individual-based rights structure if, for each pair of distinct states (s; t), (s; t) contains only unit coalitions if it is nonempty.
For any rights structure and any preference pro…le R, a state s 2 S is an equilibrium at R if, for no t 2 S fsg, so that h (s) 6 = h (t) and no K 2 (s; t) is
. We express C ( ; R) for the set of -equilibria at R.
De…nition 1 A rights structure implements F if and only if F (R) = h C ( ; R)
for all R 2 R. If such a rights structure exists, F is implementable by a rights structure.
De…nition 2 F is implementable by an individual-based rights structure if there exists an individual-based rights structure so that implements F .
KY show that the following monotonicity condition is necessary and su¢ cient for an implementation by rights structures. We formalize the condition as follows. For any preference ordering R i and outcome x, the lower contour set of
De…nition 3 (Koray and Yildiz, 2018) F satis…es the condition of image monotonicity provided that, for all x 2 Z and all
A linear ordering of agent i, denoted by P i , is a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation over Z. We denote by P Z the collection of all pro…les of linear orderings, that is, the unrestricted domain of linear orderings. Koray and Yildiz's (2018) equivalence result can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1 (Koray and Yildiz, 2018, p. 488) Let F : P Z ! Z 0 be any SCR.
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i ) F is implementable by a rights structure;
(ii ) F satis…es the condition of image monotonicity;
(iii ) F is implementable by an individual-based rights structure.
Implementation by rights structures-Full characterization
We …rst revisit implementation by rights structures. To this end, we propose two conditions that are together necessary and su¢ cient for an SCR to be implemented by a rights structure. The …rst condition is the well-known (Maskin) monotonicity (Maskin, 1999) . This condition states that, if an outcome x is F -optimal at the pro…le R and x does not strictly fall in the preference for anyone when the pro…le is changed to R 0 , then x must remain an F -optimal outcome at R 0 . For subsequently presented reasons, we de…ne below a stronger variant of the standard monotonicity condition.
It can be easily veri…ed that image monotonicity is equivalent to monotonicity w.r.t. the range of F .
The second condition is a variant of the familiar unanimity condition, which states that, if an outcome is at the top of the preferences of all agents, that outcome should be selected by the SCR. This can be de…ned as follows.
The theorem below generalizes Theorem 1 by relaxing the preference domain assumption. Indeed, our …rst main result is that only SCRs that are monotonic w.r.t.
Y , as well as unanimous w.r.t. Y , are implementable by rights structures. Moreover, what can be implemented by a rights structure can also be implemented by an individual-based rights structure, and vice versa.
Theorem 2 Take any F . The following statements are equivalent:
(ii ) F satis…es unanimity w.r.t. Y and monotonicity w.r.t. Y ;
Proof.
Assume that implements F . First, we show that F satis…es unanimity w.r.t.
Suppose that Y L(x; R i ) for all i 2 N . Clearly, for no t 2 S fsg so that h (t) 6 = x and no K 2 (s; t) is h (t) P K h (s), and thus x 2 F (R), by implementability.
Next, we show that F is monotonic w.r.t. the above set Y . To this end, take any R 2 R and x 2 Z so that x 2 F (R) = h C ( ; R). Then, there exists s 2 S so that h (s) = x. Moreover, for no t 2 S fsg so that h (t) 6 = x and no K 2 (s; t)
. Then, there exists t 2 S fsg so that h (t) 6 = x and K 2 (s; t) so that
Assume F is monotonic and satis…es unanimity w.r.t. Y . We de…ne an individualbased rights structure = (S; h; ) as follows. First, we de…ne the set T as T
We de…ne the outcome function h : S ! Z as follows: h (x; R) = x for all (x; R) 2 T and h (x) = x for all x 2 Y . Finally, we de…ne : S S N as follows. For all
We show that implements F . To this end, …x any R.
Taking any x 2 F (R), we show that x 2 h C ( ; R). Since x 2 F (R), it follows that (x; R) 2 T . We …x any i 2 N and any (y; R 0 ) or any y 2 S. Conversely, take any s 2 C ( ; R). We show that h(s) 2 F (R) : There are two possible cases as follows.
Let s = x 2 Y and …x any i. Since i is entitled to approve the change from state x to any y 2 Y and since x 2 C ( ; R), it must be that xR i y. Since the choice of ; y), we established that (x; R 0 ) = 2 C ( ; R), which is a contradiction.
Clearly, F is implementable by a rights structure if it is also implementable by an individual-based rights structure.
Remark 1 When the preference domain is P Z , as in KY, Theorem 2 implies that the range of any implementable F coincides with the set of outcomes Y because F satis…es unanimity w.r.t. Y . Given that image monotonicity is equivalent to monotonicity w.r.t. Y = F (P Z ), it follows that Theorem 2 is equivalent to Theorem 1 when the preference domain is P Z .
Implementation via codes of rights
A natural candidate for the state space of a rights structure is the set of outcomes Z. Arguably, this captures the most natural way of allocating blocking powers in real-life situations (see, e.g., Ray and Vohra, 2014) . Therefore, by assuming that the outcome function h, de…ned over Z, is the identity map, the implementation exercise is reduced to the design of the code of rights : Z Z N . For each pair of outcomes x and y, speci…es a collection of coalitions (x; y) that are e¤ective for moving from x to y. If coalition K is an element of (x; y) and if yP K x, we say that
x is blocked and K is a blocking coalition. If there is no such blocking coalition, we say that x is unblocked.
Here, we consider and analyze implementation exercises by codes of rights, which we call implementation by codes of rights.
If we choose the set of outcomes Z as the state space of a rights structure and the identity function as the outcome function in the de…nition of -equilibria, we revert to the familiar notion of core, which can be de…ned as follows.
De…nition 6 For any and any R, x is an equilibrium at R if for no y 6 = x and no
The blocking notion yields the concept of core at one preference pro…le R, which is the set of all unblocked outcomes. 7 Note that, in our de…nition of blocking, we require that every member of the blocking coalition is strictly better o¤. For any code of rights , we write C ( ; R) for the set of the equilibria at R.
De…nition 7 A code of rights implements F if and only if F (R) = C ( ; R) for all R 2 R. If such a code of rights exists, then F is implementable by a code of rights.
One can easily verify that monotonicity w.r.t. Z is a necessary condition for the implementation via codes of rights. However, one also can check that it is not su¢ cient. We introduce below a new condition, called strong monotonicity using the following additional notation. For any coalition K 2 N 0 , preference pro…le R 2 R, and outcome x 2 Z, let
We here present strong monotonicity from the viewpoint of necessity. To this end, assume an SCR F is implementable by a code of rights . Taking an outcome x 2 F (R) for some preference pro…le R 2 R, x must be an equilibrium at R. We …x any coalition K and denote by (x; K) the set of outcomes for which coalition K is e¤ective, that is, (x; K) fy 2 ZjK 2 (x; y)g. Since x is an equilibrium at R, it follows that x is unblocked, that is, for every outcome
is e¤ective in moving from x to y, then coalition K cannot be a blocking one. This entails that y must be an element of L (x; R K ) if y 2 (x; K). Since the choice of outcome y 2 (x; K) is arbitrary, the set (x; K) must be contained in L (x; R K ).
For a canonical rights structure in which the set of states is S f z; R jz 2 F R for some R 2 Rg, the designer can infer the lower contour set of R i at x for member i 2 K, that is, to infer the set L (x; R K ). 8 However, in a setting for which the state space coincides with the set of outcomes, the designer cannot obtain information on member i's lower contour sets. Hence, the designer needs to consider any preference pro…leR satisfying x 2 F R . We choose such a preference pro…leR. Then, the preceding argument leads to the conclusion that the set of outcomes (x; K) for which coalition K is e¤ective must be contained in L x;R K . This condition should be satis…ed for each admissible preference pro…leR satisfying x 2 F R , that is, the set (x; K) must be contained in the intersection
and thus the set of outcomes (x; K) for which coalition K is e¤ective, coalition K cannot be a blocking one. If this conclusion holds for all coalitions, x is unblocked, meaning it is an equilibrium at R 0 . It follows that x must be F -optimal for this pro…le by implementability. More formally, strong monotonicity can be stated as follows.
9
De…nition 8 F is strongly monotonic provided that, for all x 2 Z and all R; R 0 2 R,
Note that strong monotonicity implies monotonicity (w.r.t. Z). Conversely, for an example of a monotonic SCR that is not strongly monotonic, see the example 8 See KY (proof of Proposition 1, p. 489). 9 Our strong monotonicity condition must not be confused with the strong monotonicity condition of Peleg and Winter (2002) . The latter condition is now widely referred to as essential monotonicity (Danilov, 1992 
where
12 Let us assume that, for all u 2 U and x 2 W (u), it holds that x i`> 0 for all agents i and commodity`. 13 Let u 0 2 U CD be so that . It follows that u 0 ; u
. However, W is monotonic. 10 It can also be shown that the (constrained) Walrasian solution violates strong monotonicity in an exchange economy with more than three agents. The details are available upon request from the authors. 11 Although Cobb-Douglas utility functions are not strictly monotonic on the boundary of consumption set R 3 + , only strict monotonicity on the interior of R 3 + is necessary to obtain our result. 12 p`denotes the price of commodity`. 13 Under this assumption, the Walrasian solution coincides with the constrained Walrasian solution (Hurwicz et al., 1995) , which is known to be monotonic.
As we formally show below, strong monotonicity is a necessary condition for implementation via codes of rights, but it is not su¢ cient on its own for implementing an SCR by a code of rights. The su¢ ciency is obtained by designing a code of rights.
The problem for the designer is how to allocate blocking powers when we start from an equilibrium outcome x at R that does not belong to the range of F . We solve this problem by making every agent i e¤ective in moving from x to y, for every feasible y 2 Z. In other words, we allow the set of outcomes (x; fig) for which agent i is e¤ective to coincide with set Z. Given that x is an equilibrium at R, it must be that x is a top outcome for agent i according to his/her preference ordering R i . Then, to make x an F -optimal outcome at R, we require the familiar condition of unanimity, which states that, if an outcome is at the top of the preferences of all agents, then that outcome should be selected by the SCR. The condition can be stated as follows.
De…nition 9 F satis…es unanimity provided that, for all x 2 Z and all R 2 R, if
We show that strong monotonicity and unanimity are necessary and su¢ cient for an implementation by codes of rights.
Theorem 3 F is implementable by a code of rights if and only if F satis…es the conditions of strong monotonicity and unanimity.
Proof. "Only If ": Assume that code of rights implements F . Since it is obvious that F satis…es unanimity, we show that F satis…es strong monotonicity. Take any R and x so that x 2 F (R). Furthermore, take any R 0 so that
Assume, to the contrary, that x = 2 C ( ; R 0 ). Then, there exist y 6 = x and K 2 (x; y) so that yP
. Since x 2 C ; R and since K 2 (x; y), it follows that y 2 L x; R K . Since the choice of R 2 F 1 (x) is arbitrary, we have y 2
, which is a contradiction. Therefore, F is strongly monotonic.
"If ": Assume that F satis…es the conditions of strong monotonicity and unanimity. Let us de…ne a code of rights : Z Z N as follows. For all K,
(a) For all x 2 F (R) and all y 2 Z,
(b) For all x 2 Z F (R) and all y 2 Z, K 2 (x; y).
We show that implements F . Fix any R.
Let x 2 F (R). We show that x 2 C ( ; R). Since x 2 F (R), it follows that x 2 F (R). Then, only part (a) of the de…nition of applies. We …x any K and y.
Assume that y 2
Then, by the de…nition of , it follows that K 2 (x; y). However, since y 2 F K (x), it also follows that y 2 L (x; R K ). Moreover, by the de…nition of , it holds that K = 2 (x; y) if y = 2
. Since the choices of K and y are arbitrary, we conclude that x 2 C ( ; R).
Conversely, we take any x 2 C ( ; R). We proceed according to whether x 2 F (R) or not.
Assume that x 2 Z F (R). Then, only part (b) of the de…nition of applies. Fix any i. Since i 2 (x; y) for all y and x 2 C ( ; R), xR i y for all y, and so Z L (x; R i ). Since the choice of i is arbitrary, it follows that Z L (x; R i ) for all i. Since F satis…es the condition of unanimity, we have x 2 F (R).
Suppose that x 2 F (R). Then, F 1 (x) is not empty, meaning only part (a) of the de…nition of applies. Assume, to the contrary, that x = 2 F (R). Then, strong monotonicity implies that there exist K and y 2 F K (x) so that yP K x. Since y 2 F K (x), K 2 (x; y) by de…nition of . Therefore, there exists y 6 = x so that yP K x, for some K 2 (x; y) and so x = 2 C ( ; R), which is a contradiction.
KY (p. 495) provide a characterization of the class of SCRs implementable via
codes of rights. This result is given in terms of monotonicity (w.r.t. Z), as well as of a condition called binary consistency. The necessity for binary consistency relies on the fact that they focus on the unrestricted domain of linear orderings, P Z . To introduce this condition, we need the following additional notations. Take any P 2 P Z and any a; b 2 Z. a is said to be not Pareto dominated by b at P if aP i b for some agent i.
Take any P 2 P Z and any x; y 2 Z so that y is not Pareto dominated by x at P .
Let P xy be the pro…le obtained from P , in which x and y are the two most preferred outcomes for all agents and, for all z 2 Z fx; yg and i 2 N , it holds that xP xy z and yP xy z; further, fi 2 N jyP xy xg = fi 2 N jyP xg.
De…nition 10 F is binary consistent provided that, for all P 2 P Z and x 2 Z if for all y 2 Z that are not Pareto dominated by x at P , it holds that x 2 F (P xy ), then
Theorem 3 is logically equivalent to the characterization provided by KY. Unfortunately, we were unable to …nd a direct, intuitive bridge between the implementing conditions in these theorems, although the formal arguments of their equivalence are available from the authors upon request-see the Addendum..
Although strong monotonicity is a demanding monotonicity-type condition, we present below prominent SCRs that are implementable by a code of rights.
Example 2 (Pareto solution)
The (weak) Pareto solution denoted by P o selects all weak Pareto optima corresponding to a given pro…le R 2 R:
P o (R) fx 2 Zjfor all y 2 Z fxg there exists i 2 N such that xR i yg .
To verify that this solution satis…es strong monotonicity, assume that x 2 P o (R) for some R. Moreover, suppose that, for some R 0 , it holds that
Then, there exists outcome y 2 Z fxg so that yP 0 i x for every agent i 2 N , that is, y Pareto dominates x at R 0 . Now, we …x coalition N 2 N 0 . Next, we take any R 2 P o 1 (x) that is not empty, since x 2 P o (R). Since x 2 P o R , it follows from the de…nition of the Pareto solution that x R i y for some i 2 N . Since the choice of
is arbitrary, we have y 2 P o N (x). Since, by our initial assumption, it holds that
L(x; R 0 N ), it follows that y cannot Pareto dominate x at the pro…le R 0 , which is a contradiction. Since the Pareto solution satis…es unanimity, it follows that it is implementable by a code of rights.
Example 3 (Condorcet solution)
The Condorcet solution denoted by CON selects outcomes that are (weakly) majority preferred to any other outcome. Formally, this solution can be de…ned as follows. For all P 2 P:
where P is a (nonempty) set of pro…les of linear orderings for which the solution is well-de…ned. This SCR is implementable by a code of rights. Clearly, it satis…es the condition of unanimity. Then, we also show that it satis…es strong monotonicity. To this end, let x 2 CON (P ) for some P 2 P. Moreover, we assume that, for some pro…le P 0 , it holds that
. To obtain a contradiction, let us assume that x = 2 CON (P 0 ).
Then, there exists y so that jfi 2 N jyP . Take any P 2 CON 1 (x), which is not empty, since x 2 CON (P ). Since x 2 CON P , it follows that x is majority preferred to y at P , that is, i 2 N jx P i y i 2 N jy P i x . Since
, it follows that i 2 N jx P i y \ K is not empty. This implies that y 2 L x; P K . Since the choice of P 2 CON 1 (x) is arbitrary, we have y 2
CON K (x).
As by our initial assumption
, it thus follows that xP 0 i y for some i 2 K, which is a contradiction.
Example 4 (Individually rational solution)
The individually rational solution, denoted by Ir, with respect to some outcome a 0 2 Z can be de…ned as follows: for all R 2 R,
This SCR is implementable by a code of rights. To determine it, observe that this solution satis…es the condition of unanimity. To show that this solution is strongly monotonic, assume that x 2 Ir (R) for some pro…le R 2 R. Furthermore, let us assume that, for some pro…le R 0 , it holds that
, which is not empty, since x 2 Ir (R).
Since x 2 Ir R , it follows from the de…nition of Ir that x R i a 0 , for all i 2 N .
Since the choice of R 2 Ir 1 (x) is arbitrary, we have a We assume that preference domain R consists of sel…sh preferences R i , being de…ned over R + . This solution is implementable by a code of rights. We omit the straightforward proof that N satis…es the condition of unanimity. Let us show that it is strongly monotonic. To this end, let x 2 N (R) for some feasible R. Additionally, assume that, for some feasible pro…le R 0 , it holds that
. Then, there exists an agent i who …nds his/her assignment to be worse than the bundle assigned to agent j 6 = i, that is, x j P 0 i x i . Let us denote by x a permutation of x so that x i = x j , x j = x i and x k = x k for every other agent k 2 N fi; jg. Then, by construction and the sel…shness of preferences, x P 0 i x. Next, take any R 2 N 1 (x), which is not empty, since, by our initial assumption, x 2 N (R). Since x 2 N R , it follows from the de…nition of N that x i R i x j , and so 
Similarly, this can be done for every woman w 2 W . Let R denote the preference domain over M, obtained by a collection P of pro…les of linear orderings.
A matching is blocked by agent i at R 2 R if iP i (i). A matching is blocked by a pair (m; w) 2 M W at R 2 R if mP w (w) and wP m (m). A matching is stable at R 2 R if it is not blocked by any agent or any pair of a man and a woman at R. Given a matching problem, the stable solution, denoted by St, can be de…ned, for each R 2 R, by St (R) f 2 Mj is stable at Rg .
Theorem 4 Let (M; W; P; M) be any class of matching problems. The stable solution, St, de…ned over R, is implementable by a code of rights.
Proof. In light of Theorem 3, we need to show that St satis…es the conditions of unanimity and strong monotonicity. We omit the straightforward proof that St satis…es the condition of unanimity. Then, we need to show that this solution satis…es strong monotonicity as well.
Take any two matching problems (M; W; P; M) and (M; W; P 0 ; M). Assume that
. To obtain a contradiction, we assume that = 2 St (R 0 ). 
Suppose that is blocked by agent
i at R 0 , that is, iP 0 i (i). Then,^ = 2 L ( ; R 0 i ) for all^ 2 M so that^ (i) = i. Next,
Implementation via codes of individual rights
A code of rights is said to be a code of individual rights if, for each pair of distinct outcomes x and y, (x; y) contains only unit coalitions if it is not empty, that is, it contains only coalitions of size one. Here, we study implementation exercises in which the designer can devise only codes of individual rights, which we call implementation by codes of individual rights.
De…nition 11 F is implementable by a code of individual rights if there exists a code of individual rights so that implements F .
Although strong monotonicity is still a necessary condition for implementation by codes of individual rights, one can easily verify that it is not su¢ cient. We introduce below a stronger variant of strong monotonicity, called singleton strong monotonicity, which is shown to be necessary and su¢ cient for implementation by a code of individual rights when combined with the unanimity condition. To introduce this condition, we need additional notation as follows. For any outcome x and agent i, let
Therefore, De…nition 12 F is singleton strongly monotonic provided that, for all x 2 Z and all R; R 0 2 R, if x 2 F (R) and We omit the proof, which uses the above to prove the "If " part of the statement and similar arguments to the proof of Theorem 3.
The class of SCRs implementable by a code of individual rights is not empty. The reason is that the individually rational solution and no-envy solution are singleton strongly monotonic. Since the arguments respectively presented in examples 4 and 5 su¢ ce, we omit them here.
Non-equivalence
Coalition formation does not bring any value added to the implementation of core equilibria by rights structures; for all purposes, it is su¢ cient to focus on unit coalitions. We now show that, once one focuses on the allocation of blocking powers via the design of codes of rights, the implementation of core equilibria may require non-singleton coalitions.
By Theorems 3 and 5, it is not evident whether the class of SCRs implementable via codes of rights is equal to that of SCRs implementable by codes of individual rights. We …nd they are not identical. An example is the Condorcet solution de…ned in example 3. This result can be stated as follows.
Theorem 6 .
(i ) Singleton strong monotonicity implies strong monotonicity.
(ii ) Strong monotonicity does not imply singleton strong monotonicity.
Proof. The proof of part (i) is obvious and thus omitted. Let us now demonstrate part (ii) by assuming that N f1; 2; 3g and Z fx; yg with x 6 = y. 14 Let P Z be the set of all pro…les of linear orderings over Z. Moreover, let CON be the Condorcet solution.
One can verify that there are four pro…les fP 0 ; P 3 ; P 2 ; P 1 g P Z at each x being CON -optimal, since x is preferred to y by every agent at pro…le P 0 and by everyone except agent j 2 N at pro…le P j . Similarly, let nP 0 ;P 3 ;P 2 ;P 1 o P Z be the pro…les at which y is CON -optimal, since y is preferred to x by everyone at pro…leP 0 and by everyone except agent j 2 N at pro…leP j . By example 3, we already know that CON is strongly monotonic. To complete the proof, we need only to show that CON violates singleton strong monotonicity. One can verify that 14 For simplicity, we prove the claim by assuming n = 3. The proof will be similar for n > 3. Now, to determine whether CON violates the condition of singleton strong monotonicity, it su¢ ces to observe that, for any j = 0; 1; 2; 3, we have x 2 CON (P j )
for each i 2 N , in violation of singleton strong monotonicity.
The example constructed to prove part (ii) of Theorem 6 can be used to show that the Pareto solution is not singleton strongly monotonic. 15 In light of Theorems 3 and 5, the main implication of Theorem 6 can be formally stated as follows.
Corollary 1 Implementation by codes of rights is not equivalent to implementation by codes of individual rights.
Externally stable implementation by codes of rights
We achieved the above results by focusing on the traditional notion of core, which has been criticized for not being symmetric (Greenberg, 1990 ). Indeed, from its original de…nition, an outcome x is not a core point if it is blocked, that is, if there is a coalition that would reject x and move to another outcome y that would be preferred by all its members. However, outcome y itself can, in turn, be blocked. Then, if we require that an outcome be immune against blocking, symmetry would require that the same should hold for y. That is, we should require that blocking be done through outcomes that are themselves unblocked. This consistency requirement leads to the concept widely referred to as an externally stable core.
De…nition 13
For any code of rights and any preference pro…le R, a set Z Z of outcomes is externally stable at R if, for all y 2 Z Z , there is x 2 Z so that xP K y for some K 2 (y; x). 15 To this end, observe that x 2 P o P 0 ,
for each agent i but yet
Externally stable equilibria at R are denoted by EC( ; R). The set of equilibria in C( ; R) is unique and, hence, EC( ; R) is unique when it exists.
Here, we consider and analyze the implementation of an externally stable core by codes of rights, which we call externally stable implementation by codes of rights.
De…nition 14 A code of rights externally stable implements F if F (R) = EC( ; R)
for all R 2 R. If such a code of rights exists, F is externally stable implementable by a code of rights. F is externally stable implementable by a code of individual rights if there exists a code of individual rights so that externally stable implements F .
Externally stable implementation is a robust way of implementing optimal outcomes, particularly being more reliable than implementation, since external stability guarantees that no outcome outside the core can be sustained. An externally stable core is also more robust than the vNM stable set or its derivatives, since it avoids problems with indirect internal stability (i.e., the Harsanyi critique).
We propose two conditions that are together necessary and su¢ cient, when combined with unanimity, for an SCR to be externally stable implemented by a code of rights. The …rst condition is a variant of strong monotonicity, called strong winner monotonicity.
De…nition 15 F is strongly winner monotonic provided that, for all x 2 Z and all
In other words, this condition implies that, whenever x is F -optimal at one pro…le R and for every coalition K, x is a maximal element in
the preferences of coalition K at R 0 K , it should be F -optimal at R 0 . The intuition is straightforward. Assume that x is F -optimal at R. Since the externally stable core at this R is a subset of the core at R, we know from Theorem 3 that whenever preferences change from R to R 0 and
However, by the requirement of external stability, if x were not F -optimal at R 0 , there should exist a coalition K that can, and wants to, reject x and move to an F -optimal outcome at R 0 . This means that it is not the entire set F K (x) that matters to remove x as an equilibrium outcome when preferences change from R to R 0 , but it is set
The condition is stronger than strong monotonicity, since
Conversely, for an example of a strongly monotonic (and monotonic) SCR that is not strongly winner monotonic, see the example below. for agent i means that he/she strictly prefers a to b. Let F be so that F (P ) = fv; xg and F (P 0 ) = fxg. F is not strongly winner monotonic, since
one can verify that F is strongly monotonic (and thus monotonic).
The second condition can be stated as follows.
De…nition 16 F satis…es the no-simultaneous domination of F provided that, for all x 2 Z and all R 2 R, if x 2 Z F (R), then for some i 2 N , yP i x for some
The condition simply states that, if outcome x is not F -optimal at R, it cannot be that this x dominates every outcome in the range of F at R in the sense that x is at least as good as every F -optimal outcome at R for every agent i 2 N . When preference domain R is the domain of linear orderings, the condition implies that an outcome x that is not F -optimal at R cannot Pareto dominate every F -optimal outcome at R.
16
Our next result is that the class of SCRs externally stable implementable by codes of rights coincides with the class of SCRs that satisfy strong winner monotonicity, unanimity, and no-simultaneous domination of F .
Theorem 7 F is externally stable implementable by a code of rights if and only if F satis…es the conditions of strong winner monotonicity, unanimity, and nosimultaneous domination of F .
Proof. "Only If ": Assume that externally stable implements F . Since EC ( ; R 0 ) C ( ; R 0 ) for every R 0 2 R, it is obvious that F satis…es unanimity and the nosimultaneous domination of F . Then, we only show that F satis…es strong winner monotonicity. Take any R and x so that x 2 F (R). Take any R 0 so that
and K 2 (x; y) so that yP 0 K x. Considering implementability, y 2 F (R 0 ). Take any
. Since x 2 EC ; R and K 2 (x; y), it follows that y 2 L x; R K ;
otherwise, x = 2 C ; R , which is a contradiction. Since the choice of R 2
is arbitrary, we have y 2 F K (x). By our initial assumption that
, which is a contradiction. Therefore, F is strongly winner monotonic.
"If ": Assume that F satis…es strong winner monotonicity, unanimity, and nosimultaneous domination of F . Let us de…ne : Z Z N as in the proof of Theorem 3. We show that externally stable implements F . We …x any R. 16 For any pro…le R, we say that outcome x Pareto dominates y if xP i y for all i 2 N .
Since strong winner monotonicity implies strong monotonicity, Theorem 3 implies that F (R) = C ( ; R). We complete the proof by showing that C ( ; R) is an externally stable set.
Conversely, assume that C ( ; R) is not externally stable. Then, there exists y 2 Z C ( ; R) so that, for all x 2 C ( ; R), it holds that yR K x or K = 2 (y; x) for all K. We …x one of outcomes y. We now proceed according to whether y 2 F (R)
or not.
, strong winner monotonicity implies that there exist K and x so that x 2 F K (y) \ F (R) and xP K y. Since x 2 F K (y), it follows that K 2 (y; x) from part (a) of the de…nition of . Then, there is an outcome x 2 C ( ; R) so that xP K y for some K 2 (y; x), which is a contradiction.
Then, y 2 Z F (R). Further, from part (b) of the de…nition of , K 2 (y; x) for all x 2 F (R) and all K. Since C ( ; R) is not externally stable and y 2 Z C ( ; R), it follows that yR K x for all K, meaning y simultaneously dominates the range of F , which is a contradiction.
One may wonder whether the non-equivalence result of Corollary 1 extends to this notion of equilibrium. The answer is yes. To this end, we de…ne below a variant of strong winner monotonicity, which we call singleton strong winner monotonicity.
De…nition 17 F is singleton strongly winner monotonic provided that, for all x 2 Z and all R; R 0 2 R, if x 2 F (R) and
One can easily verify that singleton strong winner monotonicity is necessary for the externally stable implementation by a code of individual rights. Additionally, this condition is su¢ cient for the externally stable implementation by a code of individual rights when combined with unanimity and the no-simultaneous domination of F .
Indeed, we have the following theorem. Example 7 The Pareto solution, P o, is externally stable implementable. Since it is straightforward to verify that P o satis…es no-simultaneous domination of F and unanimity, we omit the proofs here. To check whether P o is strong winner monotonic, assume that x 2 P o (R) for some R. Moreover, assume that, for some R 0 , it holds that
to the contrary, that x = 2 P o (R 0 ). Then, there exists an outcome y 2 Z fxg so that y Pareto dominates x at R 0 . We …x coalition N 2 N 0 . Take any R 2 P o 1 (x), which is not empty, since x 2 P o (R). Assume that z = 2 L x; R N for some z 2 P o (R 0 ). Then, z Pareto dominates x at R, which is a contradiction. This means
Since the choice of R 2 P o 1 (x) is arbitrary, we have y 2
Since, by the above discussion, it holds that
L(x; R 0 N ), it follows that y cannot Pareto dominate x at R 0 , which is a contradiction.
Example 8
The Condorcet solution, CON , is externally stable implementable. Let us allow the cardinality of voters, n, to range over all odd natural numbers. One can easily verify that this solution satis…es the conditions of unanimity and nosimultaneous domination of F . To check whether it also satis…es strong winner monotonicity, assume that x 2 CON (P ) for some P 2 P. 17 Moreover, assume that, for some pro…le P 0 , it holds that
We show that x 2 CON (P 0 ). Take any coalition K whose cardinality is not lower than n+1 2
. Take any y 2 CON (P 0 ). Let us show that y 2
To this end, take any P 2 CON 1 (x). Since x 2 CON P , it follows that there is a voter i 2 K so that x P i y, and so y 2 L x; P K . Since the choice of P is arbitrary, as is that of outcome y, it follows that CON (P 0 ) CON K (x). Next, assume, to the contrary, that x = 2 CON (P 0 ). Therefore, there exists y 2 CON (P 0 ) so that jfi 2 N jyP . Thus, y = 2 L (x; P 0 K ). However, since we know that
, which is a contra- 17 Recall that P is a (nonempty) set of pro…les of linear orderings, for which the solution is wellde…ned.
diction.
Example 9
The individually rational solution, Ir, is externally stable implementable.
Clearly, Ir satis…es the conditions of unanimity and no-simultaneous domination of F . To determine whether this solution is also strongly winner monotonic, assume that x 2 Ir (R) for some pro…le R 2 R. Furthermore, let us assume that, for some pro…le R 0 , it holds that
. By the same arguments used in example 4, we know that a 0 2
Ir fig (x) for all i 2 N . Moreover, from the de…nition of Ir, it also holds that a 0 2 Ir (R 0 ).
Since, by our initial assumption, it holds that
Ir is strongly winner monotonic. Coalitional implementation does not quite …t any of these literature strands, as the coalitional approach relies on a certain degree of coordination by agents within a coalition. The theory is thus silent on how this will take place but assumes it will when the conditions for cooperation are appropriate. Due to this abstraction from 18 Since the same arguments also show that the individually rational solution is externally stable implementable by a code of individual rights, it follows that the class of SCRs characterized by Theorem 8 is not empty.
the details of interaction, a powerful mode of implementation becomes feasible.
We provide a full characterization of the class of SCRs implementable by codes of rights, as well as of the class of SCRs implementable by codes of individual rights.
In contrast to implementation by rights structures, the specialization of the state space in the set of outcomes has a rather intuitive implication, as we prove that, to implement an SCR by a code of rights, blocking powers need to be allocated to nonsingleton coalitions. This is the case if we want to implement the Pareto or Condorcet solutions, for example. We have also shown that this insight is robust and extends to the implementation by codes of rights for alternative de…nitions of the core, such as an externally stable core.
A persistent criticism of the theory of implementation is that the mechanisms used in the constructive proofs have unnatural features (Abreu and Matsushima, 1992; Jackson, 1992 Jackson, , 2001 ). The reason is that the devised mechanisms rely on tail-chasing constructions such as the integer or modulo games to ensure that undesired strategy combinations do not form an equilibrium. KY have shown that implementation by rights structures, as well as by codes of rights, do not su¤er from this criticism.
They have achieved this important result by focusing on the unrestricted domain of linear orderings, for which the class of (Maskin) monotonic SCRs is "small" and the implementing mechanisms are relatively simpler (Saijo, 1987; Dasgupta et al., 1979; Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) . However, it remains unclear whether this important result generalizes to other preference domains or hinges upon their domain assumption. In this regard, the characterization results presented in this paper remove any doubt, by showing that the result generalizes to any type of preference domain, even preference domains admitting indi¤erence.
We believe that the implementation framework in this paper is simple and intuitively appealing, and may thus have an important bearing on mechanism design.
The developed methodology is thus likely to prove useful in the important task of analyzing environments, where agents have incomplete information, particularly on the preferences of the other agents they are facing, as well as on incorporating elements of farsightedness. Therefore, this is a fruitful area for future research.
Addendum: not for publication Theorem 9 Take any SCR F de…ned on P Z . Then, F is monotonic (w.r.t. Z) and binary consistent if and only if F satis…es strong monotonicity and unanimity.
Proof. "Only If ": Suppose that F , de…ned over P Z , is monotonic and binary consistent.
Fix any P 2 P Z . Suppose that Z L (x; R i ) for all i 2 N . Assume, to the contrary, that x = 2 F (P ). Binary consistency implies that there exists y 2 Z, not
Pareto dominated by x at P , such that x = 2 F (P xy ), which contradicts our supposition Z L (x; R i ) for all i 2 N . Thus, F satis…es unanimity.
Let x 2 F (P ) for some P 2 P Z . Moreover, assume that for some pro…le P 2 P Z , it holds that F K (x) L(x; P K ) for all K 2 N 0 . We show that x 2 F P . To obtain a contradiction, let us suppose that x = 2 F P . Binary consistency implies that there exists y 2 Z, not Pareto dominated by x at P , such that x = 2 F P xy . De…ne the set K = i 2 N jy P i x , which is not empty by binary consistency. Also, note that y = 2 L(x; P K ), by construction. Now, take any pro…le of linear orderingsP such that n i 2 N jyP i x o = K. Suppose that x 2 F P . Then, by construction of the pro…le P x;y , it follows that K = ijy P xy x . Moreover, x P xy z for all z 2 Z fx; yg, for all i 2 N . Then, since L x;P i L x; P xy i for all i 2 N , monotonicity implies that x 2 F P xy , which is a contradiction. We conclude that for everyP 2 P Z , if
Take anyP 2 F 1 (x), which is not empty since x 2 F (P ), by our initial supposition. Since x 2 F P , it follows that n i 2 N jyP i x o 6 = K. This implies that there exists an agent i 2 K such that xP i y, and so y 2 L x;P K . Since the choice of P 2 F 1 (x) is arbitrary, it follows that y 2 F K (x). Since by our initial supposition it holds that F K (x) L(x; P K ), it follows that y 2 L(x; P K ), which is a contradiction. "If ": Suppose that F , de…ned over P Z , satis…es strong monotonic and unanimity.
Since it is straightforward to verify that F is monotonic, we omit its proof here. Let us show that F is binary consistent. Fix any P 2 P Z and any x 2 Z. Suppose that for each y 2 Z that is not Pareto dominated by x at P , it holds that x 2 F (P xy ). We show that x 2 F (P ). Assume, to the contrary, that x = 2 F (P ).
Unanimity implies that y cannot be Pareto dominated by x at P . Then, by our initial supposition, x 2 F (P xy ). Strong monotonicity implies that there exist y 2 F K (x) and K 2 N 0 such that yP K x. By construction of the pro…le P xy , it follows that K fi 2 N jyP xy i xg = fi 2 N jyP i xg. Next, take anyP 2 F 1 (x). Since y 2 F K (x), it follows that y 2 L x;P K . Since the choice ofP 2 F 1 (x) is arbitrary, it follows from x 2 F (P xy ) that y 2 L (x; P xy K ), which is a contradiction.
